C-Archief

The war in Ukraine, now in its fifth year, has reached another inflection point. Russian forces are visibly struggling on the battlefield as Kyiv’s strategy of making the war futile for Russia is working. But the future of European security does not hinge on the outcome of this war alone. Even if defeated, Russia will remain the primary threat in Europe for years to come. Despite its stagnating economy, poor demographics, and ossifying authoritarian regime, Russia remains the main power capable of and invested in upending the continent’s security architecture. Moreover, Russian military reconstitution after the war is not a question of if but of when. Defense planners and analysts are divided on the severity of the future danger that Russia’s military poses and how soon the threat could grow. Some fear that Moscow will be capable of continued aggression soon after the war in Ukraine ends. Others believe that it may take many years to reconstitute its weakened and degraded military. There is a sense that Russia’s losses of troops and equipment have left its forces in tatters and that a military incapable of making significant advances in Ukraine can’t possibly threaten Europe. Current trends suggest that Russia will reconstitute its military enough to pose a major threat faster than analysts expected back in 2022. It will likely take five to seven years, with Russia able to use force to threaten NATO members or Ukraine in more limited ways shortly after the current war comes to a close. Even if full reconstitution takes a few years longer, such a time frame is still short by defense planning standards. Russia will field a larger force with more drones, deep-strike capabilities, and personnel than before the war. It will continue to prioritize defense spending and maintain higher levels of defense industrial production. But the path to reconstitution will not be easy. Historically, Russian force development has been riddled with compromises, overly ambitious designs, insufficient resources, and poor execution. It is often a process of two steps forward and one step back. As the United States and many European states focus on ensuring Ukraine’s success, they must also think beyond this war and begin preparing for the enduring challenge that Russia poses. Russia’s military will remain strong enough to threaten NATO members’ territory and undermine the alliance, especially if continued U.S. commitment becomes uncertain. Rather than fight the way the Russian military has in the last two years in Ukraine, where the battlefield has been defined by entrenched defenses and positional fighting, Moscow will try to rebuild its capacity to conduct large-scale offensive maneuvers. It will retain a traditional focus on firepower, including artillery and precision-strike capabilities, while adding a large number of drone formations to the force. NATO forces remain superior overall but have yet to adapt to some of these changes, which could lead to higher losses in the opening days of a future war with Russia.